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A New Hero Comes to Town: The
Anglo Mining Engineer and
"Mexican Labor" as Contested
Terrain in Southeastern Arizona,

1880-1920
A. YVETIE HUGINNIE

In 1901, a story appeared in an Arizona mining town newspaper that
presents one vision of social and labor relations within the hardrock
mining industry. The story revolves around Gassy Thompson, a miner
"as well as something of a diplomat." Although usually broke, Gassy
was a man of "wonderful resources." As the story opened, he was driving a tunnel on contract for a local company. After striking "some lightening hard rock" and finding himself unable t~ make headway
compensatory wi th the val ue of his time and labor, Gassy yearned to be
rid of the contract yet still make a good showing for his labor. Returning
to town, Gassy easily convinced his manager, "a young man, recently
arrived from the states," that he needed to attend to a personal emergency as soon as the account could be settled. Both men returned to the
mine to measure the footage completed and to finalize the deal:
The [manager], who was a confiding young man, gave
Gassy the loose end of the tape to enter the tunnel,
while he remained at the mouth hol~ing the reel .... As
Gassy pierced the darkness he absent-mindedly wound
the tape a number of times around his elbow. He finally
reached the breast .... He jerked the tape, the signal
agreed upon. The [manager] noted the figures in his
book, and ... the money was paid in a check. l
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Portraying the manager as a tenderfoot in Arizona mining country,
this story comically represents the interaction of two different types of
mining men: the manager/engineer and the miner/laborer. Examined further, the vignette juxtaposes two understandings of expertise: one based
on formal training and the other on practical experience. It places considerable value on Gassy's hands-on experience, while mocking the formal education of the manager.
Of course, the actual social relations of production were far more
complex than the Gassy story suggests. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, working-class hardrock miners possessed skills the western mining industry needed; by the early twentieth century, however,
professionally-trained Anglo~American, middle class mining engineers
and managers increasingly assumed the mantle of expertise and power
in the workplace. 2 The situation was much the same in other industries.
From the, 1880s through the 1920s, bosses and managers throughout
United States industries assumed more on-the-job decision-making
prerogratives as they restructured workforces. While the pace and character of this transformation varied among industries, in part due to differences in time, place, and worker actions, there was a fundamental
shift in social relations of production. According to historian Robert
Wiebe, during that time period, industrialization, urbanization, and mechanization "distended" United States society. In its "search for order," the
society responded to those changes by establishing middle-class bureaucratic structures designed to manage and bring order to the United
States economy, society, and politics. On the industrial front, this reordering of society took the form of managers and bosses assuming more
control. 3
My examination of social relations of production in the Arizona copper industry both corroborates and contradicts the profile suggested by
Wiebe and other historians. Overall, there was an upward shift of authority, through the growth of bureaucratic structures in the workplace;
however, these structures did not bring about order. In Arizona, managers' attempts to assume control and instill order brought about disorder
and strife. This article focuses on mining engineers to examine the social
relations of production in southeastern Arizona between 1880 and 1920.
Engineers attempted to define and enforce their authority as "experts"
and as "managers," breeding conflict and chaos.
Western historians have established the mining engineer as a pivotal historical figure in the development of the regional industry. Clark
C. Spence's Mining Engineers and the American West: The Lace-Boot
Brigade, 1849-1933 is the foremost study. In his effort to move away
from a romanticized and Turnerian view of western American history,
Spence tended to naturalize the role and the rise of engineers in the
mining industry. Consequently, Spence glossed over the dramatic
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struggles around the emergence of the engineer and the contributions
of other groups within the industry. In other words,what Spence and
other western historians have depicted as a smooth and inevitable "rise"
of the mining engineer was actually a series of contests for power among
a variety of groups.· In Arizona's copper industry, the role of the engineer as expert and as' manager was contested: engineers, foremen, and
workers engaged in a complicated struggle for meanings and for power.
This struggle engaged race~ gender, and class ideplogies. 5
My work expands upon previous studies by U.S. social, western
American, and labor historians by extending the breadth of causal factors that shaped social and power relations. While class and profession
were central categories, I argue that these class and professional locations were themselves constituted and fortified by racial and gender
categories.
In examining the ways in which engineers were a racialized category,
I engage recent scholarship regarding the historical construction of
whiteness. David Roediger's study of antebellum white working class
men's construction of "whiteness" vis-a-vis their notion of "blackness"
is the foremost work in this new area of study. I indirectly explore middle
class white men's construction of their whiteness primarily in relation to
what they conceived of as "Mexican." Roediger's work and this essay
thus offer regional variations of the larger historical construction of
whiteness. 6
Finally, I rely on discursive use oflanguage. Western American historians often discuss ideology or myth independent of the social and
material context in which they existed. In this essay, I assume that the
ideological and the material are dialectically connected and are constructed within the same historical context.' I attempt to demostrate how
ideological categories such as race, class, and gender are used to shape
and disguise social relations. In the case of Anglo-American, middle
class engineers in Arizona, these categories established the foundations for their attempts to position themselves as experts and managers
in the industry.
The category of "expert" was central to the contests for power within
the western mining industry. Engineers positioned themselves as "experts," vital to the industry. They depicted themselves and their work in
masculine, heroic terms. Recent scholarship in the. history of
professionalization and of gender has demonstrated the importance of
notions of manhood in the emergence of, for example, the legai profession. 8 Anglo-American mining engineers exhibited similar patterns. They
wrote many of the earliest accounts of western mining, and in those
histories they positioned themselves at the center, as driving forces in
the industry's development. One of the principle purveyors of the engi-
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neers' importancewas T. A. Rickard, a mining engineer, journalist, and
historian. Rickard was instrumental in conceptualizing the engineer as
the new mining hero, supplanting the skilled working class,miner. 9
Rickard's belief in the importance of mining engineers infuses his
technical writings with a sense of gravity and nobility. In a technical
.presentation of new mining technology, Rickard moves beyond a strict
rendering of information, noting that something of "such momentous
importance ... deservers] to be considered historically."lo His reader
might reasonably expect a historical overview of outdated methods previously employed to accomplish the same purpose-but Rickard's "historical" treatment instead turns to Herodotus' account of how to retrieve
gold from mud and the story of Jason and the Argonauts capturing gold
with fleece. By juxtaposing engineers and their achievements with great
mythic figures of western civilization, Rickard casts a golden light on
engineers, portraying them as victorious, modern-day versions of classical heroes. These allusions to classical myths place engineers within a
larger cultural context-implicit in which are racial and gender categories. hi this heroic role, engineers saw themselves as leaders not only of
industry, but of society and of civilization as welLII
In positioning themselves as heroes, engineers relied on ideas about
science and technology emerging at the turn of the century. David Noble,
in his book America by Design, shows how engineers in science-based
industries cultivated social prestige and power by heralding the banner
of "science." While mining engineers were in a craft-based field, they
made similar assertions, contrary to Noble's argument. 12 These engineers proclaimed their expertise by asserting their heroic mastery of the
science and technology of mining. William F. Staunton, a prominent Arizona engineer, wrote: "To some people,a smelter is simply a noisy, dirty
mess, to be got away from the soonest possible moment; but to me it is
a place ofjoy-symbolic of the control by men of great creative forces." ()
Here engineering has an almost religious quality, though it is cloaked in
science and rationality. Staunton clearly implies that those like himself
who could master these forces were superior to ordinary men.
In many respects, mining engineers fit the profile depicted by Noble;
they posited themselves as experts, as masters of science, and therefore
as leaders of society. Staunton's quote, however, suggests an important
distinction between mining engineers and the science-based engineers
of Noble's study. Mining engineers, unlike chemical and electrical engineers, had to position themselves in relation to skilled workers who had
long been the mainstay of mining industries. Engineers were part of a
profound transformation of the social relations of production in the mining industry, an industry in which skilled miners had long held the leading role. This fact complicated engineers' efforts to position themselves
as experts. 14
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In defining t~emselves vis-A-vis skilled miners, engineers at times
claimed for themselves the title of "miner." In essence, they hoped to
· acquire positive features of traditional craft miners for themselves.
Rickard's depiction of United Verde Extension (UVX), one of the leading
Arizona companies, shows such an attempt. In 1911, Dr. James S. Dou- .
glas of Phelps Dodge fame, and other engineers, personally invested in
mines in Jerome, Arizona. Together they sank $275,OOOinto exploration,
until they discovered profitable ore in 1914. Describing Douglas, Rickard
declares the engineer the real champion of the UVX proj~ct, but not as
an engineer. Rather, he describes Douglas as a miner: "It requires courage, the grit of real miner, to go through with an adventure such as the
UVX." In calling Douglas a "miner," Rickard equates the engineer's investment of money and skill with the physical labor and skill oftraditional hardrock miners. Claiming the appellation of "miner," Rickard draws
a firm class distinction between the old and new miner through his emphasis on the large personal monetary investment. Futhermore, Rickard
adds, "Mining is a calling of peculiar dignity." IS Rickard presents Douglas and his fellow engineers as the new mining heroes.
In his effort to elevate engineers, Rickard disregarded the role of
workers in his UVX account. This omission points to the dilemma skilled
miners posed to mining engineers, struggling to define themselves. Miners had skills that continued to be vital to the industry, which made it all
· the more difficult-and necessary-for engineers to distinguish themselves.Spence notes that engineers depicted miners as stale, inflexible,
and resistant to change and innovation. Mining engineers, iIi contrast,
were able to "initiate and adapt." 16
Dr. Douglas' own professional history is evidence of the struggle
between engineers and miners over expertise. Despite Douglas' triumph
with the UVX, his career achievements were not always illustrious. During the mid-1880s, the Copper Queen Consolidated Copper Company,
one of Arizona's foremost mining companies, nearly went bankrupt several times when Dr. Douglas and his fellow engineers failed to locate ore
bodies. One of the most valuable ore bodies eluded Douglas, but not the
men in his employ. Wes Howell, a miner and foreman, disobeyed the
· orders of management and secretly sent a crew of miners into a tunnel
where the managers thought no ore existed. The crew had so much faith
in Howell's "sixth sense" that they worked without pay, knowing that
unless new ore was discovered the company would fail. Howell's intuition and know-how paid off when his crew found an ore body large
enough to keep the company in operation for years. 17 This incident reveals how tenuous were engineers' bluster that they alone were the
experts. Rickard omits the event from his heroic biography of Douglas.
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Much of the discourse in which engineers distinguished themselves
from miners emphasized the engineer's role as a manager. The ability to
"handle" workers became a defining element of expertise and management. This reflects their work sitution: much of the day-to-day work
performed by mining engineers was not as technical experts, but as managers. Their jobs as managers included a wide variety of financial, administrative and technical tasks. Their central chore, however, was
overseeing workers. Managers endeavored to master the workmen under their charge and to assume control and authority. Therefore, the
ability to handle miners became a basis of self-definition.
In the Arizona copper industry, struggles over the role and position
of the engineer took on racialized notions, particularly in light of
Arizona's diverse copper workforce. From 1880 to 1920, Arizona's copper workforce increasingly became more ethnically Mexican as more
Mexican and Mexican-American men gained access tojobs in the industry. 18 This "Mexicanization" occurred for a number of reasons. The development and expansion of the copper industry required large numbers
of workers, and Mexico was one obvious source of labor. Meanwhile,
during the 191Os, European immigration to the United States slowed and,
with the advent of World War I, ceased. Finally, the economic and political disruption of the Mexican Revolution, from 1910 to 1920, pushed
skilled and unskilled Mexican nationals out of that country and into
border states of the United States.
The increased participation of ethnic Mexican men occurred in different degrees. In southeastern Arizona, specifically the Clifton-Morenci
district, Mexican and Mexican-American men had been the mainstay of
the mining workforce since the 1870s. From that time through the 1920s
they composed eighty percent of the workforce, with the remainder being Anglo-American and southern and eastern European immigrant men.
Ethnic Mexican men also predominated in the Ray copper district, located in southern Arizona. Anglo working-class men, however, predominated in the other major Arizona copper districts, Bisbee-Douglas,
Globe-Miami, and Jerome-Clarkdale, respectively located in southern,
central, and northern Arizona. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, large numbers of ethnic Mexican men joined them, eventually becoming approximately twenty-five percent percent of those work
forces. Southern and eastern European immigrant men also made up a
significant proportion of these workforces. 19
Despite the varied degree of participation by Mexican and MexicanAmerican working class men, there were some practices related to "Mexican labor" in Arizona. Mexican and Mexican-American workers
throughout Arizona were poorly paid. Employers took advantage of the
poor economic and political conditions in Mexico by paying these men,
as well as women, low wages. Moreover, southwestern employers prac-
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ticed a "dual wage system" under which ethnic Mexicans, regardless of
their nationality, received lower wages than Anglos for the same work.
In Clifton-Morenci, ethnic Mexican men held a range of positions from
skilled miner to unskilled laborer. While excluded from trade and supervisory positions, they were not limited to unskilled work as was common
in other Arizona mining towns. 20
The material significance of the dual wage system is obvious: lowpaid Mexican workers underwrote the expansion of the mining industry,
building railroads, mills, smelters, mining and processing copper, and
providing maintenance and other support services. The achievements
and "expertise" of Arizona's mining engineers were thus linked to the
use of low-paid ethnic Mexican men. The dual wage system and the
availability of these workers were "the cushion upon which inexperienced managers relied to absorb losses incurred by poor mining judgment," according to Joseph F. Park, an Arizona historian. 21 Even the
Engineering and Mining Journal questioned engineers and managers'
judgement, acknowledging that "cheap labor" enabled them to speculate. In a study of the Bisbee copper district, the author of a 1904 article
wrote, "Some of the companies that have been exploring Bisbee have
been 'experted' from the front porch of the Copper Queen hotel, where
there are good chairs and a comfortable place for one's feet. "22 Engineers, as suggested, relied more upon the work and skills of "cheap
labor" than on their technical or managerial expertise.
The ideological significance of the dual wage system and the
"Mexicanization" of the industry is pivotal to the construction of engineers as experts. In their professional journals, engineers discussed at
great length the tendencies, Characteristics, and employment of "Mexican labor." That frequently used term represents a racialized, gendered,
and classed understanding of Mexican working class men. 23 The common thread throughout such discussions asserts that "Mexican labor"
needed to be managed, controlled, and directed. Such depictions of
Mexican working class men invested Anglo-American middle class engineers with an aura of expertise. Engineers' conceptions of "Mexican
labor" established their own roles as "handlers" oflabor. Moreover, the
hierarchial relationship between these two groups was often naturalized: the control of Mexican laborers by Anglo managers was frequently
said to be,rooted in shortcomings in the Mexican "race" and strengths
of the usually unmarked Anglo "race."
Central to discussions of "Mexican labor" was the notion that Mexican working class men were infinitely malleable. An October 1904 issue
of Leslie s Weekly describes Mexican workers as the backbone of the
labor force in Clifton-Morenci: "Mexican laborers are largely employed
because they work much [more] cheaply than the white laborer and are
easier to handle. "24 In 1911, the Engineering and Mining Journal char-
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acterized Mexicans as "a simple-minded people, a~customed for generations to conditions not far removed from actual servitude and who have
not yet learned to act on their own initiative. "2S Such depictions were
also gendered. Essayists in the engineering journals imbued Mexican
working class men with less-than-manly qualities. They were depicted
as childlike, emotional, and in need of goverance: "The Mexican workman intellectually is a child. He is governed by emotion rather than by
reason. He does not bother to think about what does not immediately
affect him. As a rule he is not hard to please and to satisfy."26 Mexican
men also supposedly lacked the masculine ability to protect themselves
even in the face of unjust treatment: "In showing this resentment they
often do not take the direct and straightforward course of protesting to
their boss, or patron, against the injustice, and giving their r~asons.
They fail to adopt this obvious and manly way of endeavoring to secure
redress. "27
According to these characterizations, Mexican working class men
welcomed being "handled": "He even has a strong feeling of loyalty to a
boss who appeals to him as being the real thing, that is, whom he can
respect and look up to."28 In this construction of "Mexican labor" the'
Anglo middle class manager and engineer played the role of leader and
general: the man who provided the expertise and who organized labor.
One manager wrote: "Great things have been accomplished with this
labor by those who understand and can direct it. Napoleon's maxim that
an army of sheep led by a lion is better than an army of lions led by a
sheep ... holds good. "29
In their professional journals, engineers and managers shared advice on howto handle Mexican men. One writer warned managers against
ever treating Mexican working class men as equals:
The Mexican workman will misunderstand an attitude of.
social equality toward him ... he cannot be your equal;
he must either be your superior or your inferior. Treat
him justly and kindly, but never with familiarity, for if
you do you will not only lose his respect, but you will
spoil him as a workman. He will regard this treatment as
an evidence of weakness and fear, and will endeavor to
become your master. In his eyes your attitude will be a
confession of weakness and inferiority.30
This discouraged Anglo middle class managers from rethinking or transgressing the social boundaries among classes and races of men. The
warning implied that such transgressions reduce the Anglo
middle~class man to the racial subordinate and rob him of his manhood
in the process.

.

A. YVETIE HUGINNIE

331

While some articles depicted the ability to handle Mexican working
men as a skill to be learned, most presented it as an innate quality of
Anglo middle class men. In either case, handling "Mexican labor" was a
test of a manager's skill in a way that managing white workers was not:
The Anglo-Saxon laborer will maintain his standard of
work under poor leadership, but the Mexican rapidly
deteriorates. Real leadership implies a superiority-superiority in patience, knowledge, courtesy, tact, refinement, force, and courage. Character is the grandest
thing, it is the basis of all achievement. Different types
of men are successful in controlling Mexican labor, but
whatever the type, it must be genuine. Any false note
will have a bad effect on discipline. They respect the
quiet and refined type of superior who has the air and
manner of a gentleman and who possesses a confident
way of directing them. 31
This quote marks the Anglo managers' class and race with notions of
"character," "refinement," "courtesy," and "tact," while still retaining
more physical attributes such as "force" and "courage." The AngloAmerican middle class man, because of his social status and refinement,
was best suited to manage. 32 Similarly, Anglo middle class managers'
constructions of Mexican labor "marked" Mexican working class men's
race by attributing supposed characteristics to their race:
To understand the Mexican workman-and without understanding there can be no real success in directing
him-one must go back to his racial origin. Half of the
population of Mexico is pure Indian.... The mass of the
people, and nearly all of the laboring class, show general Indian characteristics. 33
These passages racialize power relations between Anglo middle class
managers and ethnic Mexican working class men. The writer asserts that
subservience is inherent in the latter's racial makeup; by extension, that
assertion invests the "unmarked" racial category of the managers-their
"whiteness"-with an inherent proficiency in leadership. Because these
constructions of Anglo engineers and "Mexican labor" are so thoroughly
raced and gendered, it is difficult to extricate racial ideologies from those
of gender. Indeed, I would argue that these categories are inseparablethey help to constitute each other. Depictions of race are themselves
gendered, just as depictions of gender are always within a racialized
context.
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While the articles in mining engineers' professional journals uniformly agreed that Mexican working class men needed to be "handled,"
they offered varying asssessments of Mexican working class men's intellectual abilities and skills. Some engineers and managers wrote that
Mexican men lacked intelligence and skill, often attributing that deficiency to their race. Others recognized a range of skills and the ability to
learn new ones. This suggests that depicting Mexican working class
men as unskilled and lacking in intelligence was less crucial to managers
than positioning them as needing a "handler."
Of course, these ideological concepts had very concrete material
consequences: "handling men" meant, in part, having the power to hire,
to fire, and to profit from another's labor. Furthermore, these beliefs lent
credence to the economic pattern of the dual wage system. These ideological constructions of race and gender masked and naturalized power
relations.
These constructions of Mexican working class men also served to
delegitimize their defiance 'of managers' assumptions of power and their
resistance to practices such as the dual wage system. Referring to these
male workers as "emotional" and to their resistance as "resentment,"
managers presented Mexican working class men's actions as irrational,
childlike tantrums instead of strategies for empowerment. That Anglo
managers needed to address and undercut Mexican men's actions suggests a power struggle.
In the workplace, engineers attempted to shape laboring men's work
habits and cultures by restructuring them according to company needs.
Copper managers tried to assert authority over workers both on and off
the job; issues included turnover, length of the workday, work pace, use
of new technology, and drinking. Workers, however, challenged this authority even though managers had at their disposal the power to hire
and fire.
The size of mining operations-in terms of physical layout and number of employees-further complicated managers' attempts to assert au~
thority. Copper production necessitated economy of scale. In Arizona,
the leading companies operated a score of mines, mills, and smelters,
and employed thousands of workers. The Clifton-Morenci district's largest companies, Arizona Copper, Detroit Copper, and Shannon Copper,
employed over 10,000 men at the height of World War I. No manager
could "handle" all of these workers. Therefore, they relied on a network
of lower-level Anglo supervisors to control workers' behaviors.
Much of the responsibility of exerting company authority fell to
foremen: Anglo working class men experienced as skilled miners, but
whose job was to supervise other workers. That cadre of lower-level
supervisors was responsible for the day-to-day supervision of all workers, including tradesmen and miners. In personal contact with workers,
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those foremen issued orders and attempted to regulate men's work habits. Making rounds through the mines and mills, they supervised workers, reprimanding or firing men caught not working or violating company
rules. Copper managers relied upon foremen as part of the broader industrial transformation of social relations of production during the first
two decades of the twentieth century.34 While the tendency within United
States labor historyis to view this managerial structure as whole and
cohesive, my work shows otherwise. In the western mining industry,
the managerial structure was another site of struggle between managers
and foremen. Foremen were managers' means of asserting control over
workers, and although managers were dependent upon foremen, they
did not want to relinquish authority. Foremen had many years ofpractical experience as skilled miners-more than engineers or managers. Foremen had their own notions of expertise and authority, beliefs which were
often positioned as superior to managers. Managers thus had to control others' control.
In their professional journals, engineers and managers discussed,
and at times debated, the qualities that made a good foreman. At the
heart of these discussions were issues of character, workplace authority, interpersonal relationships, and notions of manhood. In 1906, the
Mining and Scientific Press ran a series of letters and articles about the
foreman, the last of which, taken from a handbook written by Ernest
McCullough, described the ideal foreman. McCullough's expectations
of a foreman were high: he must be knowledgeable of and have experience in all aspects of mining and also be a "master" of men. According
to McCullough, the foreman makes the company profit; therefore, a good
foreman should be given complete control over laboring men and daily
operations. The manager's role then would be to monitor closely the
foreman's performance, as indicated by revenues, and fire him if he lost
money or be·came too familiar with the workers. According to
McCullough, good foremen were, unfortunately, as "scarce as the proverbial hen's teeth."lS
The bulk of the McCullough article was devoted to circumscribing
interpersonal relationships among managers, foremen, and workers. The
ruin of a foreman was to get too close to "his" men; a foreman should
not listen to men's troubles, especially not "family troubles." A foreman
should assert his authority and his manhood by showing that he has
"no patience with a man who is continually voicing his hard luck and
troubles." A foreman should be called "Mister" and should never socialize with his men: "If he is generally called by his first name by his
men, and is found to go with the crowds to the nearest saloon at quitting
time, it is doubtful if he ever gets,the best results from the men under
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him." Respect was the only legitimate feeling for a foreman to inspire in
his workers; any kind of affection, camaraderie, or love was a sign of a
bad foreman.)6
Overtly relying upon notions of manhood, McCullough similarly
proscribed personal relationships between foremen and managers. While
he suggested that the scarcity of a good foreman would make a manager
want to befriend the man, McCullough strongly warned against crossing that boundary: "an appreciative pat on the back goes to the head
like champagne." His comment implies that affection or appreciation ruined proper relationships among grades or classes of men and destroyed
the manhood of the subordinate by making him light-headed or giddy.
McCullough used notions of manhood to denote proper authority and
control within the workplace.
Taking great exception to McCullough's remarks, a letter writer,
"Miner," utilized his own notions of manhood to define the role of a
foreman and relations among these two types of Anglo mining men.
"Miner" challenged McCullough's desire to restrict interpersonal relations by describing his ideal foreman in quite different terms: "The best
foreman of a mine I ever knew was illiterate, not much of a worker himself, yet he knew how; he would hob-nob and drink with anyone, and get
drunk too; but he could handle men, and distribute labor to advantage,
he was very successful as a foreman." This letter suggests a very different sense of relations among mining men, one built upon camaraderie
and personal relations rather than depersonalized control.
"Miner" agreed that McCullough's idealized foreman had greater
knowledge of mining than any manager could. Whereas McCullough
firmly established the subservience of this idealized foreman to his manager, "Miner" argued that such a foreman's superior knowledge should
place him above his manager. In words laden with sarcasm, "Miner"
critiqued McCullough's idealization:
[McCullough's foreman] was a perfect paragon, a blending of angel and tyrant, a philosopher and diplomat, he
must take his whisky alone.... It is a foregone conclusion that such a man would not remain a foreman. He
would rise? Why? Because there is more pay higher up,
with generally, less knowledge of the business required
than the foreman possess[es] . . . . No wonder such
forem[e]n are scarce as hen's teeth.)7
"Miner" rejects McCullough's assumption that a manager who knows
less about the business than his subordinates should nonetheless retain his position, status, and profit. He insists that the more knowledgeable foreman would of course rise into a job that paid more money and
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required less knowledge. "Miner's" heavy sarcasm makes his larger meaning somewhat harder to pin down, but he appears to mock the class
distinctions that force foremen to remain in positions subordinate to
managers who know a great deal less than they do. Where McCullough
referred to champagne, for example, "Miner" talks about whiskey, and
his own paragon is illiterate rather than a "philosopher and diplomat,"
happy to "drink with anyone" rather than the type "who must take his
whiskey alone." "Miner's" biting remarks point to the fact that, by the
turn of the century, it was class and professional boundaries, rather
than expertise, that placed managers over foremen.
These ideological constructions had material significance in the social relations of the mining industry. In Arizona's copper towns, managers' attempts to assert their expertise and control bred conflict. In 1903,
1915, and 1917, tensions in Clifton-Morenci engendered large strikes. In
the summer of 1917, miners across the state went out on strike. That fall
President Woodrow Wilson's Mediation Commission, established to
mediate wartime labor conflicts, held hearings in Clifton-Morenci because of the protracted strike and the need for copper during the war. 38
The records of the Clifton-Morenci hearings provide a unique window
into social relations in the industry. Conflict reigned as Anglo managers, Anglo foremen, and ethnic Mexican miners struggled for power. The
hearings demonstrate that managers' attempts to expand their control
over workers had precipitated the massive walkout.
While Anglo managers looked to Anglo foremen to impose order
upon the predominantly ethnic Mexican workforce, that supervisory hierarchy was itself riddled with confli.ct. Upper- and lower-level Anglo
supervisors argued over who should be managing workers. In testimony
before the commission, three copper foremen portrayed both
labor-management relations and intra-management relations as muddled.
Directing their complaints equally against workers and managers, these
men argued that they themselves were the mining men most capable of
exercising authority at the point of production.
Arizona Copper Company foreman H. P. Hill complained that efficiency at the mines suffered because he and other foremen were not
given enough authority to maintain discipline over men, even in the
simple yet dangerous task of handling powder magazines. 39 Ultimately
blaming upper-level managers, Hill complained that working men left
dynamite in their stopes at the end of shifts even though magazines,
located at the entrance of the mines, existed for extra charges. As foreman, howev~r, Hill had no authority to fire men who repeatedly broke
this rule; company managers had reinstated workers and shift bosses
whom he had dismissed. 40
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Lee Lawhead described similar tensions between lower-level supervisors and company managers. He reported that the latter often disregarded the suggestions of foremen and shift bosses when making
decisions. According to Lawhead, the workplace lacked discipline because company managers did not uphold foremen's decisions. Perceiving power relations in terms of "us" and "them," Lawhead complained,
"[There is] a grievance committee here, but they [the managers] have
overruled everything we do; they are always right and we are always
wrong. "41 Lawhead and Hill argued that foremen knew work situations
firsthand and thus should have the authority to enforce measures in the
. Clifton-Morenci copper operations. They depicted copper managers, in
contrast, as men preoccupied with wartime profit margins and labor shortages; according to Lawhead, "we have been the [scape]goats all the
way through. "42
Just as racial ideologies informed managers' sense of their own expertise, they shaped Anglo foremen's assertions of authority over ethnic Mexican workers. Across the state, ethnic Mexicans suffered more
severe abuse from Anglo foremen than did other workers. Charles E.
Witesman, a lower-level supervisor, told a federal investigator that
"Mexicans are treated brutally, being abused bodily by the foreman."43
Physical violence and abusive treatment by Anglo foremen against ethnic Mexican workers added to the strife in Clifton-Morenci. Workers
countered such treatment, often collectively: in one instance, when an
Anglo foreman put a hot lamp on an ethnic Mexican worker's bare back,
a wildcat action erupted. 44
Wildcat strikes were one way ethnic Mexican men resisted lowerand upper-level supervisors' attempts to control them. Between January
1916 and July 1917, ethnic Mexican men conducted at least sixteen wildcat strikes in the Clifton-Morenci district. These job actions usually
involved between several dozen to several hundred men. Most often
they were staged to protest low wages and abusive actions. On one
occasion, ethnic Mexican men in the converter department of the smelter
went on strike because the company hired an Anglo man as supervisor
instead of promoting one of them. In another instance, several men went
on strike after a shift boss physically assaulted a mucker who had quit
working before the end of the shift. 4S
Faced with a strife-ridden managerial hierarchy and persistent resistance by his ethnic Mexican workers, Arizona Copper Company manager Norman Carmichael took drastic steps to bolster his control. In
1916, he called on Anglo .timbermen to take on supervisory duties.
Carmichael granted the Anglo timbermen power to oversee co-workers
whenever foremen and shift bosses were not present. 46 This strategy
decentralized managerial authority at a time when the tendency across
United States industries was toward the centralization of power. The
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racial and social context of the Southwest made Carmichael's order seem
logical; in his enlistment of Anglo timbermen, he relied upon racial hierarchies to bolster managerial authority.
This attempt to assert control produced more conflict. Ethnic Mexican men not only rejected the alleged authority of Anglo timbermen, but
also disputed Carmichael 'sauthority to designate Anglo timbermen as
their bosses. Wildcat strikes flourished, many triggered by Anglo
timbermen giving orders to ethnic Mexican miners. Opposition to
Carmichael's move led to the murder of one timberman. 47 Superintendent
Carmichael complained to the President's Mediation Commission that
these wildcat actions had become so prevalent that the word strikitos
(little strikes) was commonly heard in the community;48
Carmichael's repeated efforts to assert control betrayed his lack of
authority andprovoked increasing discord. On 28 June 1917, he issued a
multi-page statement to all workers; of particular note are his words
about timbermen:
The giving of directions by timbermen has been, and is
being, bitterly resented by other workers in the [stopes]
on the supposition that the timberman has no jurisdiction or authority over them. A timberman, Jim Maggi,
was murdered and thrown down a ladderway by a miner
who resented his instructions. Other timbermen have
been intimidated by the open threats that they would
get "the same as Jim Maggi got" .... It is necessary for
the safety and efficiency of the work that this authority
should be delegated to the timbermen and acknowledged
by the men working with him. 49
As Carmichael again publicly granted Anglo timbermen the authority to
give orders and supervise other men, ethnic Mexican workers repudiated his claim to bestow such powers, Two days following Carmichael's
letter, 10,000 Clifton-Morenci miners went out on strike.
Although ethnic Mexican men composed over eighty percent of the
Clifton-Morenci workforce, the President's Mediation Commission permitted only two to testify. C. A. Vargas was an officer in the local union
as well as a strike leader; he also served as the secretary of Arizona
Copper Company's General Grievance Committee. His testimony on management intervention in the workplace contrasts sharply with depictions given by foremen. Vargas told the commission that complaints
about abusive Anglo foremen kept the committee busy. While the committee was able to settle some of the grievances, whenever a complaint
reached the manager, the ethnic Mexican worker lost regardless of the
evidence. Vargas argued that foremen who engaged in abusive behavior

338

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW

OCTOBER 1994

should be dimissed. He accused the company manager of using grievances to fire union men. His testimony challenged Anglo foremen's presumptions that they should control ethnic Mexican workers, and Vargas
denounced the means by which they· asserted their power. $0
Vargas' testimony posed a powerful challenge to Anglo middle class
managers' positions as leaders. Indeed, he proposed a different notion
of what qualifies one for "manhood" when he stated that the district's
company managers did not act "honorably." He noted that in 1916,
Carmichael and the other managers had promised federal mediators that
they would adjust wages for men working on contracts, but they had yet
to fulfill that promise. Sl
Vargas also rejected Anglo managers as "handlers." Contrary to the
many articles concerning "Mexican Labor" discussed above, Vargas insisted that he and the thousands of men behind him did not seek or
require that kind of treatment:
We have no satisfactory way of adjusting a grievance ..
. . The general managers take the stand that he is the
supreme power and if his word is not satisfactory to us
we can strike. We don't want to strike over one or two
men so we passed it up. That is the reason we do not
have any relief. S2
Vargas also asserted that ethnic Mexican men had appropriate leadership in the form of their own local union. He placed the blame for the
strikes on attempts by Anglo foremen and managers to assume excessive and dishonorable power.
Despite the fact that Clifton-Morenci had remained quiet and peaceful during the strike, members of the President's Mediation Commission
viewed ethnic Mexican work~rs as violent and out of control. The commissioners repeatedly raised the specter of Mexican men overrunning
the district. They believed that unacceptable behavior by Mexicans was
at the root of problems in the district. S3 In their questioning of Vargas,
the Anglo commission members focused on what was, to them, an unacceptable level of strike activity, rather than on foremen and managers'
actions. They questioned whether Vargas' union or another organization could really "inflict discipline" on the Mexicans. Members of the
commission repeatedly asked whether these "boys" could be controlled. $4
Commissioner Spangler stated, "One of the troubles here is that you
have had seventeen big and little strikes. You haven't union methods to
discipline the boys. They do not pay any attention to you, they do as
they please."ss The commissioners' perceptions-their concern with vio-.

A. YVETIE HUGINNIE

339

lence, their preoccupation with control, and their assumption that any
action by ethnic Mexican workers was out of control-were permeated
with racial ideologies~
In response, Vargas refuted assertions by Anglo middle class managers, foremen, and commissioners that ethnic Mexican men on strike
were necessarily "out of control." In a particulary heated exchange,
Vargas contested the idea that when Mexican working class men stood
up for themselves they were "causing trouble." Furthermore, Vargas rejected the notion that the union was supposed to "discipline" its members-that it was anything other than an extension of the men
themselves. He insisted that the men were taking reasonable and appropriate steps through the union to improve their work and living conditions, and that for doing so they were unjustly deemed radical and "out
of control":
Now, for the last twenty-five years the men in this district have been good workers. They have always depended on their work. Now, since we were organized in
1915, why every man has taken some position as an officer in the union, [but) according to [the copper companies) he is a dynamiter or an I. W. W., or he is
everything bad.... No men are causing trouble; we are
just looking after the men to see that things are right.'6
To Vargas, his union provided a voice to workers, not a means of controlling them. Moreover, he identified the cause of the conflict as Anglo
managers' attempts at complete control and their betrayal of promises
regarding work conditions and wages. Above all, Vargas' testimony challenged the notion that ethnic Mexican working class men wanted and
needed to be led by Anglo men.
In Clifton-Morenci, Anglo managers, Angio foremen, and ethnic
Mexican workers struggled for power and control. Racial, gender, and
class ideologies profoundly informed these conflicts. The picture of
social relations within the regional copper industry, as presented before
the President's Mediation Commission, was one of conflict rather than
order. The sheer number of wildcat strikes, the siz~ of the 1917 strike,
and the complaints by Anglo managers and foremen before the
President's Mediation Commission are testimony to ethnic Mexican men's
resistance to "handling" by Anglo men.
At the behest of the commissioners, the Clifton-Morenci workers
went back to their jobs and awaited a ruling by the commission. The
decision ultimately' estabiished another company-controlled grievance
committee while failing to respond to workers' grievances about abuse
(
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and wages. The commissioners' failure to address the concerns expressed
by Vargas is suggestive of the extent to which racial,gender, and class
ideologies informed wartime labor policy.
The social relations of production in Clifton-Morenci as well as the
ideological constructions of engineer, manager, foreman, and miner were
more complex and conflict-ridden than the Gassy Thompson story which
opened this essay would suggest. That vignette posits a vision of social relations that obscured tensions and struggles as much as engineers' writings did, although in different ways. As I have argued, the
position of mining engineers was a contested site. In both ideological
and social realms, other men in the mining industry"-specificaIIy Anglo
foremen and ethnic Mexican miners-disputed Anglo middle class engineers' claims to expertise, claims based on knowledge and especially on
the ability to "handle" working men.
Gassy's triumph over his manager offers ajub~lant and gleeful conclUSion for traditional miriers-a conclusion quite different from the
transformation taking place in the social relations of production at the
time. The story offers a benign version of the labor-management struggle
in the industry. In the vignette, Gassy does challenge the role of the
engineer, both in terms o{his expertise and his management abilities.
This challenge, however, goes uncontested.· Given the history of the
"strikitos," as well as the huge 1917 strike in Clifton-Morenci, it is clear
that this tale takes the conflict out of labor-management struggles. The
story presents the worker as having evaded his duties, as opposed to
having legitimate complaints or demands. It then ends with the worker
having achieved a simple victory by hoodwinking the manager. The resolution is neat, not conflict-ridden. The appellation "old-timer" does acknowledge the ultimate demise of the traditional miner. It presents it as
an inevitable and uncontested process; a result, perhaps, merely of old
age.
By investing men with regional identities, the narrative presents an
allegory of the larger social and power relations within the industry: the
eastern-trained manager loses against the old-time westerner. Gassy is
the figure of western ingenuity. The allegory simplifies the complex workings of capitalism by reducing them to a struggle between two regions
of the United States. Contrary to many recent historical accounts, the
industrial development of the West was not controlled by the East. Corporate interests and elites in Arizona, California, and Montana, for example, shaped this transformation.
The industrial development of Arizona involved complicated sets of
power relations; including but not limited to economics; thus the regional identification of the two characters has other implications as well.
The Gassy Thompson story depicts an encounter between two Anglo
men. Neither is specifically identified or "marked" as Anglo; their names
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and positions imply they are Anglo, while the story remains silent on
the issue of race. The vignette thus presents a contest between the
eastern outsider and the western insider. Gassy is "western" and an
"old-timer"; the story implies that he is of the region. The story grants
nativity to him, as opposed to the ethnic Mexicans who had been the
predominant workers and residents in Clifton-Morenci's mining industry since its inception. The story presents a southwestern history with;'
out ethnic Mexicans. The vignette demonstrates the workings of racial
hegemony, marking some groups as racialized and eclipsing such roles.
Much like "Mexican labor," the "Anglo foremen," and the "Anglo
manager," Gassy himself is an ideological construction that shaped and
masked social relations and struggles for power. These sets of power
relations profoundly informed the history of the mining industry and the
development of western American society.
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